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ABSTRACT. In order to explore the conditions of successful irrigation management, this 
study investigates the determinants of household contributions to the cleaning of irrigation 
channels and the availability of water. By using primary data collected in an irrigation 
scheme in Uganda, we find that household contributions to the cleaning of irrigation channels 
are determined by the scarcity of irrigation water, opportunity cost of labor, and private 
benefit associated with plot size. We also find that the availability of irrigation water 
increases in the tertiary irrigation area where the coefficient of variation of plot size is large.   
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1.         Introduction 
Facing an acute food crisis in 2008, deep concerns with deteriorating food security and 
poverty  incidence  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  were  expressed  by  policy  makers, 
practitioners, and researchers interested in poverty reduction and development in this region. 
Alarmingly, the yield of the grains in SSA has been stagnant while the population continues 
to grow rapidly over the last 40 years. As a result, food production per capita is already 
declining in the region (Otsuka and Kijima, 2009). This is in sharp contrast to the experience 
of Asia, where rice and wheat yields more than doubled in the same period due to the 
diffusion of fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding modern varieties (MVs), which is well 
recognized as the Green Revolution. Considering the increasing population pressure on 
limited land resources in SSA, one possible solution to achieve food security and reduce 
poverty is to seek for an Asian-style Green Revolution. At the same time, however, many  
studies are skeptical about this strategy, and one of the major reasons for this skepticism is 
the under-development of irrigation in SSA (Spencer, 1994; World Bank, 2008). 
Gravity irrigation is the most popular irrigation system in SSA, which is characterized 
by common-property or common-pool resources (CPRs) and, hence, it is used jointly by a 
group  of  farmers.  To  manage  irrigation  facilities  effectively  and  allocate  water  resources 
efficiently, it is critically important to enforce the rules of water allocation and maintenance 
of irrigation channels and drainages (Ostrom, 1990). Yet, past government-led large-scale 
irrigation projects generally failed because of the absence of enforced rules. Thus, recent 
studies emphasize the importance of rural communities in managing CPRs and recommend 
the transfer of irrigation management authority from governments to communal user groups 
(Ostrom, 1990). In fact, communities that are characterized by the close personal ties of their 
members often set and enforce rules effectively for irrigation management by such means as 
social sanctions and peer supervision among community members (Bardhan, 1993; Seabright,  
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1993; Hayami and Godo, 2005). However, not all communities are successful in organizing 
collective  action  to  maintain  irrigation  schemes.  It  is  therefore  important  to  identify  the 
conditions of successful collective irrigation management by a community.    
Several  studies  find  that  the  small  size;  the  social  homogeneity  of  a  community, 
represented  by  the  same  caste  or  ethnic  group;  and  economic  inequality  are  important 
determinants of successful irrigation management (Bardhan, 2000; Dayton-Johnson, 2000; 
Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002; Fujiie et al., 2005; Kajisa et al., 2007; Ito, 2006). Most of these 
studies focus on community-level analyses and use the activeness of water-user groups or the 
cleanness of the irrigation channels, which is measured subjectively by ‘good’ or ‘poor,’ as an 
indicator of the performance of community irrigation management. The determinants of the 
contribution of individual users to the collective irrigation management and the allocation of 
water among them are seldom explored.
1 It must also be pointed out that studies on irrigation 
management in SSA are scanty. 
In this study, we investigate important characteristics of water-user  households and 
their  group  characteristics  that affect  their  contribution  to  irrigation  management  and  the 
availability of irrigation water at the plot level by using the data collected in an irrigation 
scheme in Uganda. We use the directly measured water depth at the plot level as an objective 
indicator of the performance of the collective action. We aim to reveal the mechanism by 
which specific characteristics of water-user households affect the extent of collective action, 
which community-level analyses cannot reveal. For this purpose, we conducted a household 
survey in the Doho Rice Scheme (DRS) in Uganda. 
                                                   
1 To  our  knowledge,  Gyasi  (2005),  who  analyzes  the  household  contribution  to  irrigation 
management in 52 communities in Ghana, is an exception. Somewhat related is the study of 
household  participation  in  watershed  management  in  Haiti  by  White  and  Runge  (1994; 
1995), who conclude that farmers who are members of farmer organizations are more likely 
to participate in watershed management projects. Also related is Gaspart et al. (1998), who 
find that households with large plots of land located near drainage (and thus acquire large 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general description 
of the study site and explains the data collection method. In Section 3, we develop testable 
hypotheses based on a literature review and field observations. Section 4 presents the results 
of  the  statistical  analyses  of  the  determinants  of  household  contributions  to  collective 
irrigation management and water depth. The paper ends with the conclusions in Section 5.  
 
2. The Structure of the Study Site and the Data  
2.1 The structure of the study site 
Rice  cultivation  in  Doho  started  in  the  1940s.  The  Chinese  government  began  to 
construct the irrigation scheme in 1976 and completed it in 1989. The DRS is the largest 
irrigation scheme in Uganda and is designed to serve irrigation water to 1,000 ha of paddy 
fields. It is located 260 km to the east of the capital city of the country, Kampala, and about 
4,340 farmers grow rice in the scheme. The DRS is located in a bimodal rainfall zone, and 
farmers have engaged in double-cropping of rice for more than a few decades. Most of the 
farmers live in nearby villages and grow various crops in their upland fields, in addition to 
rice grown in lowland plots in the DRS. The farmers in the DRS grow modern varieties 
(MVs) of rice, which were either MVs developed by the International Rice Research Institute 
in the Philippines in the 1970s and brought by a Chinese aid agency when the irrigation 
scheme was constructed, or cross-bred varieties between local varieties and Asian MVs. 
The scheme is still owned by the government, and farmers are entitled only to 99-year 
leases for their plots. There is now a government irrigation management office where several 
staff members are working. However, except for their salaries and occasional support for the 
maintenance of the channels, the government provides no financial support for the scheme. 
Figure 1 shows the structure of the DRS, which consists of 13 blocks connected by 
three  layers  of  channels:  main,  sub,  and  tertiary  channels.  The  main  channel  provides  
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irrigation water from the Manafwa River to the scheme. It branches out into the sub-channels, 
which provide irrigation water to each block. Basically, each block has one sub-channel and 
consists of 5 to 15 smaller zones called strips. Each strip is surrounded by a tertiary channel 
that provides irrigation water to the plots of 20 to 30 farmers and by a tertiary drainage. The 
tertiary drainage for one strip serves as the tertiary irrigation channel for the strip next to it, as 
is  shown  in  the  enlarged  figure  of  a  strip.  After  flowing  through  paddy  fields,  water  is 
collected into the main drainage through the tertiary and sub-drainages and drained into the 
Manafa River again.  
Farmers are responsible for cleaning the main, sub, and tertiary irrigation channels and 
the main, sub, and tertiary drainages. The cleaning of the main and sub- channels and the 
main and sub-drainages is supposed to be carried out collectively by the farmers in the block. 
In addition, each farmer is responsible for cleaning the tertiary irrigation channel and tertiary 
drainage that his plot faces. Under the leadership of a voluntary farmers’ group, the Doho 
Rice Scheme Farmers’ Association (DRSEFA), each block has 1 chairman and 10 counselors 
who are responsible for mobilizing farmers for cleaning the main and sub-channels and the 
main  and  sub-drainages.  They  are  also  responsible  for  monitoring  whether  the  tertiary 
irrigation channels and drainages are cleaned. If a farmer does not clean the tertiary irrigation 
and drainage channels along which his plot is located for a long time, he is supposed to be 
punished and is not allowed to cultivate the plot for two seasons.  However, this punishment 
is rarely implemented in practice. 
Most of the water gates that control the water flow from the main channel to the sub-
channels are broken, and there is no effective means to control water going into the sub-
channels.  Thus,  there  is  no  clear  water  rotation  system  implemented  among  the  blocks. 
Furthermore, almost no strip has any explicit rules on water distribution among farmers in the 
strip. DORSEFA is also in charge of collecting irrigation fees. If a farmer does not pay the fee,  
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he is not allowed to cultivate the plot for two seasons. However, this punishment for the non-
payment of irrigation fees is also not fully implemented in practice, and only 40% of the 
irrigation fees are collected on average. 
The downstream area of the scheme, covering 200 ha, is cultivated informally by a 
group of farmers using drained water from the main scheme. These farmers are called out-
growers. The channels in the out-grower areas have structures similar to those of the DRS, 
and the out-growers collectively and voluntarily maintain the channels. Thus, we include the 
out-growers in our analysis and treat their whole plots as one block. 
 
2.2 Data 
Three rounds of field surveys were conducted by the senior author from April to June 
in 2007, in November 2007, and in March 2008. Out of 13 blocks in the DRS, we excluded 3 
blocks from our sample because there was no main drainage, and the channels have different 
structures in these blocks. Therefore, our survey covers the remaining 10 blocks and the out-
grower area. We randomly sampled 55 strips in the 11 blocks out of 121 strips. We sampled 
plots from each strip, which are located at 200m, 400m, 600m, 800m, and 1000m from the 
water intake of the strip along the tertiary channel (Figure 1). The total length of the strip 
varies, ranging from 400m to 1000m, and is on average about 600m. We sampled three plots 
from one strip on average. Doing so enables us to investigate how the contributions of the 
household to the cleaning of the channels and the availability of water differ at different 
points in the irrigation scheme.   
In the first round of the survey in 2007, we interviewed 158 cultivators to collect data 
on their household income and household contribution to the cleaning of the channels in 2006. 
In the second round of the survey in the same year, we physically measured the water depth 
in the sample plots 90 days after rice was planted, because water availability is critically  
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important at the flowering stage of rice cultivation that takes place 90 days after planting. We 
measured the water depth in 103 plots in the second season of 2007.
2 In the third round of the 
survey in 2008, we again attempted to interview the original sample cultivators to collect 
detailed  data  on  rice  cultivation  in  the  sample  plots  such  as  harvest,  input  use,  and  the 
contribution  to  the  cleaning  of  the  channels  in  the  first  and  second  season  of  2007.  We 
interviewed 142 households for the first season of 2007 and 146 households for the second 
season  of  2007.
3 In  this survey,  we also collected  some additional  information  about  the 
cultivators in 2006. We could revisit and collect the recall data of 138 and 140 households for 
the first season and the second season of 2006, respectively.  
 
3. Descriptive Analyses and Testable Hypotheses 
   Let us begin our analyses by developing our hypotheses based on a literature review 
and field observations. Existing studies suggest that the scarcity of irrigation water is one of 
the important determinants of the degree of cooperation among farmers (Fujiie et al. 2005; Ito, 
2006). We can expect that the longer the distance from the main channel to the intake of the 
strip  (Di),  the  scarcer  water  is  at  the  intake  of  the  strip  (Figure  1).  The  availability  of 
irrigation water in the j
th plot in the i
th strip (Wij) further depends on the distance from the 
intake of the strip to each plot along the tertiary channel (dij). The longer the distance is, the 
less water is expected to be available due to the use of water by upstream farmers as well as 
filtration  and  evaporation  losses.  The  availability  of  water  also  depends  on  the  total 
contribution to the cleaning of the tertiary channel made by the upstream farmers in the strip 
                                                   
2 We conducted a direct measurement of water depth in November 2007, when the rice was 
supposed to be at the flowering stage in most of the sample plots. However, in this year, 
there was a critical water shortage and some farmers planted rice late.  This is the main 
reason for the reduction in the sample size. 
3 The difference in the sample size in the two seasons stems from the fact that some of the 
plots are rented out and the cultivators in two seasons are not necessarily the same.  We 
sometimes  failed  to interview  the cultivators  of  the plots because they were sick or had 
moved out at the time of the interview.  
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and the cultivator’s own contribution to the cleaning of the tertiary channel (Cij). When the 
tertiary channels are well maintained, less water is lost and even plots far away from the 
intake of the strip can receive sufficient water. When irrigation water is scarce, the marginal 
value product of water is high, and hence farmers may have more incentive to contribute to 
the cleaning of the irrigation channels to increase available irrigation water.   
Unlike  cleaning  of  irrigation  channels,  farmers  seem  to  have  incentives  to  clean 
drainages, particularly when flooding occurs. Thus, the marginal gain from cleaning drainage 
channels tends to be large when flooding is severe, which is the case near the main and sub-
drainages as well as near the intake.  
Table 1 examines the relationship between the distance from the main channel to the 
intake of the strip (Di) and water depth. Consistent with our expectation, water depth first 
decreases as the distance from the main channel to the intake of the strip increases. Contrary 
to our expectation, however, water depth increases as the distance increases to more than 2km. 
This may be because the land slopes downward away from the main irrigation channel, and 
water tends to accumulate near the main drainage, especially where the drainage does not 
function well. Therefore, we observe a U-shape relationship between the distance from the 
intake of the strip and water depth. 
Table 1 also summarizes the relationship between the distance from the main channel 
to the intake of the strip and the household contribution to the cleaning of the main and sub-
channels, the tertiary channel, and the tertiary drainage.
4 The household contributions to the 
cleaning of the main and sub-channels have inverted-U relationships with the distance from 
the main channel to the intake of the strip, with the peak around 2-3km. The fact that water 
depth first decreases and then starts to increase, whereas the household contribution initially 
                                                   
4 We exclude the household contribution to the cleaning of the main and sub-drainages from 
our analysis because it is only 1.5 person-hours on average and most of the observations are 
censored at 0. Even if we add this variable to the household contribution to the cleaning of 
the tertiary drainage, the results are essentially the same.  
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increases but gradually decreases, can be explained by the tendency that when the irrigation 
water is scarcer and, hence, the marginal productivity of irrigation water is higher, farmers 
work harder to clean the channel to obtain more irrigation water. On the other hand, the 
household contribution to the tertiary drainage increases as the distance becomes longer.  This 
may  be  because,  in  the  downstream  area  where  plots  are  located  near  the  sub-drainage, 
farmers have more incentive to contribute to the cleaning of the tertiary drainage to avoid 
flooding.  
The lower half of Table 1 shows the relationship between the distance from the intake 
of the strip to each plot (dij) and water depth and household contribution to the cleaning of the 
irrigation and drainage channels. Although an unexpected peak in water depth at 400m is 
observed, less water is provided to the farther plot as we expected. On the other hand, we 
cannot observe any clear tendency in household contribution to the cleaning of the main and 
sub-channels or the tertiary irrigation channel. As can be expected, households increase their 
contribution  to  the  cleaning  of  tertiary  drainage  as  the  distance  becomes  longer.  These 
observations lead us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis  1:  The  scarcer  the  irrigation  water  is,  the  more  households  contribute  to  the 
cleaning of irrigation channels. On the other hand, households in the downstream area of the 
main and sub-channels and tertiary channel contribute more to the tertiary drainage in order 
to avoid flooding. 
 
Another important determinant of water management discussed in the literature is the private 
benefit associated with plot size (White and Runge, 1994; Gaspart et al. 1998), as farmers 
with larger plots enjoy larger benefits of well-cleaned channels and drainage. Hence, large 
cultivators would have more incentive to contribute to the cleaning of channels and drainage  
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than small ones. Table 2 examines the relationship between the size of the cultivated area in 
the sample strip and household contribution to the cleaning of irrigation channels and tertiary 
drainage. It seems clear that the larger the size of the cultivated area is, the more contribution 
a household makes to the cleaning of both irrigation channels and drainage. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is postulated as follows: 
  
Hypothesis 2: The larger the plot size in the sample strip is, the more households contribute to 
the cleaning of irrigation channels and drainage.  
 
One issue related to plot size is inequality in cultivation size or landholdings.  The theoretical 
predictions of the impact of inequality in landholdings on the provision of public goods such 
as well-cleaned channels are mixed. Olson (1965) argues that inequality might be beneficial 
to the provision of public goods when a few members obtain a significant proportion of the 
total benefit from the public goods and, hence, have strong incentives to provide them, even 
if they have to pay almost all of the cost. Baland and Platteau (1997) support this argument 
by suggesting that only an agent with a strong interest will contribute to the provision of 
public goods, while others prefer to have a free ride on the agent’s effort. The implication is 
that greater inequality in cultivation size within a strip may increase the provision of labor for 
collective irrigation management. Bardhan et al. (2006), in contrast, argue that a threshold 
level of landholdings exists such that a group member who has land more than this threshold 
contributes  to the collective effort to increase irrigation water.  They  predict that equality 
among contributors may be beneficial to the provision of public goods to the extent that the 
average landholding exceeds the threshold level. 
Table 3 compares water depth and household contribution to the cleaning of irrigation 
channels and drainage between strips with relatively equal and unequal land distributions.  
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Strips with equal  or unequal land distributions are  defined as  strips with  a coefficient of 
variation of plot size less than or more than its average value, 75%. A plot in a strip with 
larger inequality of plot size receives more irrigation water. Furthermore, a household that is 
in a strip with unequal distribution of plot size contributes more to the cleaning of main and 
sub-channels and tertiary drainage. These findings may be consistent with the argument of 
Olson (1965), who predicts that inequality may enhance the likelihood of collective action.  
The household contribution also depends on the opportunity cost of labor associated 
with non-farm income and upland crop cultivation (Bardhan, 2000; Dayton-Johnson, 2000; 
Fujiie et al.2005). Farmers with high opportunity costs of labor may have lower incentive to 
cooperate in  irrigation management. Since educational attainment  is a  good proxy of  the 
opportunity  cost  of  labor  associated  with  non-farm  income,  Table  4  summarizes  the 
relationship  between  the  educational  attainment  of  household  members  and  household 
contributions  to  the  cleaning  of  irrigation  channels  and  tertiary  drainage.  Educational 
attainment is measured by the average years of schooling of household members who are 
older than 15 years of age. For descriptive analysis, we compare cases in which the average 
years of schooling of household members are less than or more than seven years, which 
corresponds to the completion of primary education in Uganda. Table 4 demonstrates that 
households with highly educated members contribute less to the cleaning of channels and 
tertiary drainage. 
A  related  determinant  of  household  contribution  to  cleaning  of  the  channels  is  the 
number of adult household members. Since the agricultural labor market is imperfect due to 
the high monitoring cost of wage workers (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993), the supply of labor is 
significantly affected by the endowment of family labor. Thus, the number of adult household 
members  may  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  household  contribution  to  the  cleaning  of 
channels. In Table 4, we compare the household contribution to the cleaning of irrigation  
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channels and tertiary drainage between the two groups, where the number of adult household 
members is less than or more than its average of 4 people. Households with a large number of 
adult members are expected to contribute more to the cleaning of all types of channels than 
those with a small number of adult members. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 3: Households with highly educated members and with fewer members contribute 
less to the cleaning of irrigation channels and drainage. 
 
Although an individual household may determine the household contribution to the cleaning 
of a channel based on its private benefit and cost, the availability of irrigation water will be 
determined importantly by the behavior of other farmers. In fact, if upstream farmers in a 
strip  do not clean the channel or overuse water, downstream households cannot  receive 
much  irrigation  water.  Therefore,  it  seems  reasonable  to  argue  that  water  depth  is 
determined primarily by the collective effort of strip members.  Based on this reasoning, the 
fourth hypothesis is postulated as 
       
Hypothesis 4: Since the availability of irrigation water in a particular plot depends critically 
on the collective effort of strip members, measured water depth depends on the characteristics 
of strip members more than individual household characteristics. 
 
4. Regression Analyses 4. Regression Analyses 4. Regression Analyses 4. Regression Analyses 
4.1 Methodology 
 
In  order  to  examine  the  determinants  of  household  contributions  to  the  cleaning  of 
channels and water depth in each plot, we estimate the following two types of regression 
functions:  
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where Cij is the household labor contribution to the cleaning of the main and sub-channels, 
tertiary irrigation channel, or tertiary drainage in a season measured by person-hours, whereas 
Wij is the water depth (cm) in the sample plot. 
We include the distance from the main channel to the intake of the strip (Di) and its 
squared term, as well as the distance from the intake of the strip to each plot (dij) and its 
squared term. One can expect that water depth decreases as both distances from the main 
channel  to the intake of the  strip (Dij) and from the intake of  the  strip to each  plot (dij) 
increase.  However,  as  we  discussed  earlier,  there  is  a  possibility  that  water  depth  first 
decreases and then increases as the distance from the main channel increases (Dij), because 
water tends to accumulate near the drainage. If so, we will observe a U-shape relationship 
between the distance from the main channel to the intake of the strip and water depth. Our 
first  hypothesis  argues  that  the  scarcer  the  irrigation  water  is,  the  more  a  household 
contributes to the cleaning of the irrigation channel. Therefore, if the distance from the main 
channel has a U-shape relationship with water depth, it should have an inverted-U shape 
relationship with the household contribution to the cleaning of irrigation channels. On the 
other hand, if water depth decreases as the distance from the intake of the strip (dij) increases, 
then the household contribution should increase as the distance becomes longer. 
In order to statistically test our second hypothesis that the private benefit associated with 
plot size influences the household contribution to the cleaning of channels, we include the 
total size of the cultivated area in the sample strip, including the sample plot. We also include  
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their squared term. The size of the cultivated area in the sample strip is expected to have a 
positive impact on the household contribution to the cleaning of channels and drainage.   
In  order  to  test  our  third  hypothesis,  we  include  educational  attainment,  which  is 
measured by the average years of schooling of adult household members, and the number of 
adult household members, both of which are subsumed under Hij. The former should have a 
negative impact on the household contribution, while the latter should have a positive effect.  
We  also  include  Ui,  which  is  a  set  of  variables  explaining  strip  characteristics. 
According to existing studies, the size and economic inequality of community members are 
identified as important determinants of the success of irrigation management (Bardhan, 2000; 
Fujiie et al., 2005). Therefore, we include the number of farmers in the strip to indicate the 
size of the user group, and the coefficient of variation of plot size in the strip as an indicator 
of inequality of landholdings. 
Existing studies also point out the importance of community mechanisms such as social 
sanctions and peer supervision working among group members (Fujiie et al. 2005; Miguel 
and Gurgerty, 2005). We include the “density of farmers with close personal ties” in the same 
strip (Rij). More specifically, we consider the number of relatives and the number of the same 
village members in the same strip, both of which are divided by the distance of the strip. If 
the  density  of  farmers  with  close  personal  ties  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  household 
contribution to the cleaning of irrigation channels and drainage, then we can attribute this to 
some kind of community mechanism for enforcing collective action.   
In order to control for the effects of other factors, we include the size of the cultivated 
area in other strips in DRS and the size of the cultivated area in upland area, which are 
denoted by Oij. These variables have negative effects on the household contribution, because 
the larger the size of these areas, the higher the opportunity cost of labor would be. Season 
dummies are also included.  
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Note that our fourth hypothesis predicts that strip characteristics such as membership 
size of the strip and the coefficient of variation of plot size in the strip may have significant 
impacts on water depth, but not necessarily characteristics of individual households such as 
the land endowment and educational attainment of household members. Also note that the 
coefficients of labor contribution function, i.e., equation (1), will be different among the three 
cases—cleaning  of  main  and  sub-channels,  tertiary  channel,  and  tertiary  drainage.  A 
particular difference occurs between the cleaning of irrigation channels and drainage, because 
the former pertains to the allocation of scarce water whereas the latter is related primarily to 
reducing excess water during flooding. 
 
4.2 Regression Results  
The determinants of water depth 
Table 5 shows the regression results of the water depth function.  We estimate the 
models using Tobit estimation since the observations are censored at zero.  We report the 
results, which include no dummy, block dummies, and strip dummies, respectively, from (1) 
to (3). 
According to model (1), the coefficient of distance from the main channel is negative 
and significant and that of its squared term is positive and significant, implying that distance 
has a U-shape relationship with water depth. In other words, water depth first decreases as the 
distance from the main channel to the intake of the strip increases up to 2km, after which it 
increases. This relationship is not observed when we include the block dummies in model (2), 
because they capture the impact of distance from the main channel.   
According to model (3), the distance from the intake of the strip to each plot has an 
inverted-U-shape relationship. Although we are not sure why water depth increases initially 
up to 350m, it decreases after this point, as we expected.    
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Consistent  with  the  fourth  hypothesis,  household  characteristics  such  as  cultivated 
areas and educational attainment of adult household members do not have significant impacts 
on water depth in all of the models from (1) to (3). On the other hand, strip characteristics 
such as the coefficient of variation of plot size have a significant and positive impact on the 
water depth in models (1) and (2). These observations suggest that the water depth of an 
individual plot is determined primarily by the contribution of group members but not by the 
effort of the individual household. The positive and significant coefficient of variation of plot 
size implies that inequality of plot size in the strip increases water depth at the plot level. As 
will be discussed later, households with larger plots contribute more than proportionately to 
the cleaning of the tertiary channel. This may be the reason the coefficient of variation of plot 
size has a positive impact on water depth. 
Since some studies (e.g., Bardhan, 2000) predict the U-shape relationship between the 
inequality of cultivated plot size and the outcome of collective action, we add the squared 
term of the coefficient of variation in plot size in models (4) and (5). Model (4) does not 
include any dummies, while model (5) includes block dummies. The squared term of the 
coefficient  of  variation  of  plot  size  is  insignificant  in  both  models,  (4)  and  (5).  Other 
coefficients  are  essentially  consistent  with  the  models  without  the  squared  term  of  the 
coefficient of variation, shown in models (1) and (2). 
 
The determinants of the cleaning of irrigation channels 
Table  6  summarizes  the  regression  results  of  the  determinants  of  household 
contributions to the cleaning of the main and sub-channels (models (1) to (3)) and tertiary 
irrigation channel (models (4) to (6)). We estimate models (1) to (3) by employing the Tobit 
estimation method because some of the farmers do not contribute to the cleaning of the main 
and sub-channels at all, whereas we use OLS to estimate models (4) to (6). We report the  
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results, which include no dummy, block dummies, and strip dummies. 
The distance from the main channel to the intake of the strip has an inverted U-shape 
relationship with household contribution to the cleaning of the main and sub-channels, as 
well as tertiary channel, with the peak around 1.5km in models (1), (2), and (4). As we found 
earlier, water depth has a U-shape relationship with the distance from the main channel to the 
intake  of  the  strip.  Therefore,  households  contribute  more  to  the  cleaning  of  irrigation 
channels when irrigation water is scarcer, which is consistent with our first hypothesis. 
The distance from the intake of the strip to each plot has a U-shape relationship with 
the household contribution to the cleaning of main and sub-channels, with its peak around 
350m in model (2). Considering that water depth has an inverted-U shape relationship with 
the distance from the intake of the strip to each plot at a peak around 350m, this is also 
consistent  with  our  first  hypothesis  that  the  household  contribution  is  determined  by  the 
scarcity of irrigation water. Unexpectedly, however, the distance from the intake of the strip 
to  each  plot  does  not  have  any  significant  impact  on  the  household  contribution  to  the 
cleaning of the tertiary channel in models (4) to (6).  
The density of relatives has a positive impact on the household contribution to the 
cleaning of the main and sub-channels and the tertiary channel in models (1) and (5). Also, t-
statistics  are  not  low  in  models  (4)  and  (6).  These  findings  suggest  that  the  community 
mechanisms of enforcement work among closely related strip members, especially for the 
cleaning of the tertiary channel. This is consistent with existing studies, which emphasize the 
importance of community relations in collective irrigation management (Fujiie et al., 2005). 
It  is  important  to  realize  that  the  coefficients  of  the  squared  term  of  size  of  the 
cultivated area in the sample strip are positive and significant in models (1), (4), and (5). This 
means  that  households  increase  their  contribution  to  the  cleaning  of  channels  more  than 
proportionately as the cultivated area in the strip becomes larger. This seems to explain why  
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the coefficient of variation of plot size has a positive impact on water depth. These findings 
are consistent with the argument of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), who predict that inequality 
may enhance the likelihood of collective action as economic agents with large endowments 
may bear a larger portion of costs associated with cooperative action.   
The coefficients of the average years of schooling of adult household members are all 
negative and four of them are significant for the household contribution to the cleaning of 
channels.  The  number  of  adult  household  members  significantly  increases  the  household 
contribution to the cleaning of main and sub-channels and tertiary channels in all the models. 
These findings are consistent with our third hypothesis regarding the opportunity cost of labor. 
 
The determinants of the cleaning of tertiary drainage 
In  Table  7,  we  show  the  regression  results  of  the  determinants  of  household 
contribution  to  the  cleaning  of  tertiary  drainage.  We  estimate  the  models  using  Tobit 
estimation as some of the sample farmers do not contribute at all. We report the results, which 
include no dummy in model (1), block dummies in model (2), and strip dummies in model (3). 
Both the distance from the main channel to the intake of the strip and the distance from 
the intake of the strip to each plot have U-shape relationships with the household contribution 
to  the  cleaning  of  tertiary  drainage.  This  is  likely  because,  in  the  extreme  upstream and 
downstream areas of the sub- and tertiary channels, flooding is serious so that farmers have 
strong incentives to contribute to the cleaning of tertiary drainage to reduce floodwater. 
The size of cultivated area in the sample strip has an inverted-U relationship with its 
peak at 1 ha in all three models. Since almost no household cultivates more than 1 ha in a 
sample strip, this means that the size of the cultivated area has a positive impact on the 
household contribution to the cleaning of tertiary drainage. This is consistent with our second 
hypothesis regarding the effect of plot size.  
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The size of other cultivated area in DRS has a U-shape relationship with its peak at 2 
ha. Since less than 1 percent of sample households have other cultivated area larger than 2 ha 
in DRS, this almost implies that the size of other cultivated area in DRS has a negative 
relationship with the household contribution to the cleaning of tertiary drainage. This may be 
because when the size of other cultivated area is large, the opportunity cost of labor becomes 
high. Furthermore, since flooding tends to occur everywhere in the whole scheme more or 
less at the same time, farmers with many large plots in DRS contribute less to the cleaning of 
tertiary drainage in the sample strip than farmers with small plots. 
The  coefficient  of  the  second  season  2007  dummy  is  negative  and  significant, 
presumably because the whole scheme suffers from low rainfall and a shortage of water in 
this particular season. As a result, farmers may have more incentive to clean the irrigation 
channels rather than drainage. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  This study examined the determinants of household contributions to the cleaning of 
irrigation channels and drainage as well as the water depth in each plot. By doing so, we 
aimed to identify critically important household characteristics that affect collective irrigation 
management. The empirical results demonstrated that the scarcity of irrigation water, private 
benefit  associated  with  plot  size,  and  the  opportunity  cost  of  labor  are  the  important 
determinants  of  household  contributions  to  the  cleaning  of  irrigation  channels.  This  is 
consistent with other studies that suggest the importance of private incentive to provide a 
collective good (White and Runge, 1994; 1995; Gaspart et al., 1998). Our empirical results 
also suggest that the community mechanisms of enforcing collective action work to some 
extent among closely related strip members, especially for the cleaning of tertiary channels. 
This is also consistent with existing studies that emphasize the importance of social sanctions  
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and peer supervision based on close personal ties for the provision of public goods (Fujiie et 
al., 2000; Miguel and Grgerty, 2005).   
In  addition,  we  estimated  the  water  availability  function.  We  found  that  strip 
characteristics,  rather  than  household  characteristics,  are  important  determinants  of  water 
depth in each plot. Especially, inequality in plot size in a strip has a positive and significant 
impact on water depth, largely because a household with a large plot contributes more than 
proportionately to the cleaning of irrigation channels. These findings are consistent with the 
argument  of  Olson  (1965),  who  predicts  that  inequality  may  enhance  the  likelihood  of 
collective action. 
However,  we  should  be  careful  to  conclude  that  inequality  in  landholdings  always 
improves collective irrigation management. For example, Dayton-Johnson (2003) cites field 
studies from Gujarat and Tamil Nadu,  India, explaining that the egalitarian nature of  the 
community, small variation in farm size, or both appear to be conducive to the formation of a 
water users’ association. Tang’s (1992) synthesis of several studies found that a low variance 
of average annual family income among irrigators tends to be associated with a higher degree 
of  rule  observance.  Since  collective  action  is  seldom  organized  in  DRS,  a  reasonable 
hypothesis may be that inequality increases collective effort when collective agreement is 
weakly enforced.  
Our results suggest that farmers are responsive to their private benefit and cost when 
they determine their contribution to the cleaning of channels. Therefore, in order to make 
collective irrigation management more effective, we should set rules of punishment or reward 
so as to make farmers’ private benefit and cost consistent with the social benefit and cost. 
Sethi  and  Somanathan  (2006)  suggest  that  the  prospect  of  punishment  against  non-
contributors should be sufficient to induce cooperative behavior of farmers. Tachibana et al. 
(2001) emphasize that support from the local government for a communal forest users’ group,  
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particularly the punishment of violators of management rules, is conducive to the effective 
management of minor forest resources in Nepal. In DRS, punishment for non-contributors to 
the  cleaning  of  irrigation  channels  is  seldom  imposed.  The  government  should  support 
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Table 1. Water depth (cm) and household contribution to the cleaning of channels 
(person-hours) by distance from the main channel and along the tertiary channel 
 
 Distance from the main channel (Di)  0-1km  1-2km  2-3km  3-4km  Average 
Water depth (cm)  3.78  1.53  1.63  2.26  2.81 
Sample Size  (55)  (22)  (16)  (10)  (103) 
Household contribution to the cleaning 
of channels  (person-hours)           
Main & Sub-Channels  10.5  13.3  8.1  7.1  10.5 
Tertiary Irrigation Channel  11.6  12.4  15.3  13.0  12.5 
Tertiary Drainage Channel  5.8  6.6  6.4  8.4  6.3 
Sample Size  (292)  (139)  (84)  (51)  (566) 
 
  Distance along tertiary channel (dij)  200m  400m  600m  800m  1000m 
Water depth (cm)  2.8  3.6  2.5  1.8  0.0 
Sample Size  (39)  (28)  (29)  (6)  (1) 
Household contribution to the cleaning 
of channels (person-hours)           
Main & Sub-Channels  10.3  11.7  8.9  9.1  22.4 
Tertiary Irrigation Channel  12.3  13.0  12.0  12.8  13.7 
Tertiary Drainage Channel  6.8  5.4  6.5  7.2  10.3 
Sample Size  (201)  (185)  (145)  (27)  (8)  
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Table 2. The size of cultivated area in a sample strip and the household contribution to 
the cleaning of channels (person-hours) 
 













Household contribution to the cleaning of 
channels (person-hours) 
         
Main & Sub-Channels  10.6  8.9  10.5  13.5  16.0 
Tertiary Irrigation Channel  9.2  11.2  13.8  15.0  26.8 
Tertiary Drainage Channel  2.8  6.1  8.3  9.9  13.8 
Sample Size  (175)  (202)  (122)  (24)  (43)  
  27
Table 3. The coefficient of variation of plot size in a strip and water depth (cm) 
and the household contribution to the cleaning of channels (person-hours) 
  
Strips with equal 
landholdings
1 
Strip with unequal 
landholdings
1 
Water depth (cm)  2.3  3.5** 
Sample Size  (58)  (45) 
Household contribution to the cleaning 
of channels (person-hours)     
Main & Sub-Channels  9.5  11.7** 
Tertiary Irrigation Channel  12.5  12.4 
Tertiary Drainage Channel  5.3  7.5*** 
Sample Size  (312)  (254) 
 
Note: Strips with equal or unequal landholdings are defined as strips with a coefficient of variation of 
plot size in the strip less than and equal to or more than its average value, 75%. 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% in the t-test comparing households in strips with equal and 
unequal landholdings. 
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Table 4. The number of adult household members, average years of schooling of adult 






less than or 











less than or 







Household contribution to the cleaning of 
channels (person-hours)         
Main & Sub-Channels  11.0*  9.2  9.8  12.0** 
Tertiary Irrigation Channel  12.8  11.7  11.2  15.5*** 
Tertiary Drainage Channel  6.4  6.1  5.6  8.0*** 
Sample size  (404)  (162)  (395)  (171) 
 
 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% in the t-test comparing households with 
average years of schooling of adult household members less than or equal to and more than 7 years 
and those with less than or equal to 4 and more than 4 adult household members. 
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Table 5. Determinants of water depth (cm) 
 
Water depth (cm)  
Tobit 












Geographical position of plot           
Distance from the main channel 
(km)  
-3.998***  -1.549    -4.154***  -1.301 
[3.49]  [0.62]    [3.60]  [0.52] 
Distance from the main channel 
(km) squared 
0.966***  0.714    1.006***  0.689 
[2.84]  [1.33]    [2.95]  [1.30] 
Distance along tertiary channel 
(km)  
8.350  12.778  12.180  6.68  10.385 
[0.92]  [1.34]  [1.65]  [0.74]  [1.09] 
Distance along tertiary channel 
(km) squared 
-12.171  -17.947  -17.498**  -10.35  -15.205 
[1.19]  [1.63]  [2.10]  [1.02]  [1.39] 
Strip characteristics           
No. of strip members  0.055  0.034    0.041  0.017 
[1.41]  [0.80]    [0.99]  [0.38] 
Coefficient of variation of plot 
size in the strip 
0.061***  0.066***    0.209  0.269* 
[2.96]  [2.88]    [1.43]  [1.86] 
Coefficient of variation of plot 
size in the strip squared 
      -0.001  -0.001 
      [1.03]  [1.43] 
Household characteristics           
Density of relatives  -1.131  0.669  -2.736  -1.388  0.523 
[0.38]  [0.21]  [1.02]  [0.47]  [0.17] 
Density of people from same 
village 
0.025  0.494  1.383  -0.003  0.467 
[0.01]  [0.26]  [0.77]  [0.00]  [0.25] 
No. of adult hh members  0.135  0.146  0.110  0.133  0.119 
[0.71]  [0.71]  [0.47]  [0.71]  [0.58] 
Average years of schooling of 
adult hh members 
0.189  0.155  -0.001  0.195  0.157 
[1.60]  [1.35]  [0.01]  [1.65]  [1.38] 
Size of cultivated area in the 
sample strip (ha) 
-3.451  -3.559  0.215  -3.672  -3.613 
[0.53]  [0.55]  [0.04]  [0.57]  [0.57] 
Size of cultivated area in the 
sample strip (ha) squared 
4.735  4.144  0.719  5.240  4.649 
[0.63]  [0.55]  [0.10]  [0.70]  [0.62] 
Size of other cultivated area in 
DRS (ha) 
1.342  1.731  2.106  1.576  2.035 
[0.61]  [0.79]  [1.01]  [0.71]  [0.94] 
Size of other cultivated area in 
DRS (ha) squared 
-1.426  -1.663  -0.976  -1.600  -1.899 
[1.12]  [1.31]  [0.81]  [1.25]  [1.50] 
Size of cultivated area in upland 
(ha) 
0.007  -0.109  -0.497  -0.086  -0.200 
[0.01]  [0.17]  [0.77]  [0.13]  [0.32] 
Size of cultivated area in upland 
(ha) squared 
0.028  0.049  0.079  0.044  0.065 
[0.30]  [0.52]  [0.64]  [0.45]  [0.69] 
Constant  -4.275  -9.745  -3.436  -9.043  -16.958** 
[1.18]  [1.90]*  [1.35]  [1.53]  [2.35] 
Observation  103  103  103  103  103 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6. Determinants of household contribution to the cleaning of irrigation channels 
(person-hours) 
 
  Main & Sub (person-hours)  Tertiary (person-hours) 
  Tobit  OLS 














Geographical position of plot             
Distance from the main channel 
(km)  
5.160**  7.834    2.72  -1.585   
[2.17]  [1.41]    [1.54]  [0.38]   
Distance from the main channel 
(km) squared 
-1.972***  -2.175*    -1.123**  -1.438   
[2.77]  [1.85]    [2.13]  [1.63]   
Distance along tertiary channel 
(km) 
-14.794  -24.579  -17.763  0.970  6.551  8.826 
[0.96]  [1.60]  [1.18]  [0.08]  [0.57]  [0.72] 
Distance along tertiary channel 
(km) squared 
19.525  32.607**  23.008  3.085  -4.697  -7.478 
[1.21]  [2.03]  [1.45]  [0.26]  [0.39]  [0.57] 
Strip characteristics             
No. of strip members  0.099  0.156    -0.045  0.040   
[1.22]  [1.57]    [0.75]  [0.55]   
Coefficient of variation of plot size 
in the strip 
0.108***  0.037    -0.021  -0.015   
[2.62]  [0.78]    [0.68]  [0.41]   
Household characteristics             
Density of relatives  12.978**  6.636  6.378  7.089  9.379  9.800 
[2.06]  [0.98]  [0.85]  [1.51]  [1.86]*  [1.59] 
Density of same village member  -2.242  1.265  4.033  0.724  -2.266  -5.713 
[0.64]  [0.34]  [0.85]  [0.28]  [0.83]  [1.48] 
No. of adult hh members  0.717*  1.031**  1.221***  0.938***  0.886***  0.709** 
[1.81]  [2.58]  [2.77]  [3.20]  [2.99]  [1.97] 
Average years of education of 
adult hh members 
-0.416  -0.380  -0.641**  -0.331*  -0.420**  -0.369* 
[1.63]  [1.48]  [2.30]  [1.78]  [2.23]  [1.66] 
Size of cultivated area in the 
sample strip (ha) 
-13.610  -11.153  8.293  1.832  -0.983  7.314 
[0.98]  [0.80]  [0.55]  [0.18]  [0.10]  [0.60] 
Size of cultivated area in the 
sample strip (ha) squared 
28.446*  25.641  5.992  21.843*  28.275**  20.689 
[1.78]  [1.61]  [0.35]  [1.86]  [2.40]  [1.49] 
Size of other cultivated area in 
DRS 
-0.168  0.485  1.367  -2.070  -1.547  -0.435 
[0.06]  [0.18]  [0.46]  [1.04]  [0.76]  [0.18] 
Size of other cultivated area in 
DRS squared 
-0.115  -0.285  -0.316  0.744  0.728  0.357 
[0.17]  [0.42]  [0.43]  [1.46]  [1.42]  [0.60] 
Size of cultivated area in upland 
(ha) 
-1.069  -1.526  -0.875  0.325  0.859  0.180 
[0.76]  [1.09]  [0.59]  [0.32]  [0.84]  [0.15] 
Size of cultivated area in upland 
(ha) squared 
-0.043  0.021  -0.088  -0.079  -0.169  -0.036 
[0.20]  [0.10]  [0.39]  [0.52]  [1.10]  [0.20] 
2nd season 2006  3.437*  3.533*  3.556**  0.425  0.343  0.310 
[1.74]  [1.84]  [1.99]  [0.29]  [0.24]  [0.21] 
1st season 2007  -0.382  -0.520  -0.369  -3.096**  -3.128**  -2.945** 
[0.19]  [0.27]  [0.21]  [2.13]  [2.19]  [2.03] 
2nd season 2007  -3.178  -3.077  -2.950  -0.399  -0.498  -0.419 
[1.61]  [1.59]  [1.64]  [0.28]  [0.35]  [0.29] 
Constant  -0.938  -3.729  5.148  9.485*  22.938***  9.675* 
[0.13]  [0.33]  [0.76]  [1.81]  [2.71]  [1.75] 
R-squared        0.17  0.21  0.25 
Observations  566  566  566  566  566  566 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. /  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table7. Determinants of the household       contribution contribution contribution contribution       to the cleaning of  to the cleaning of  to the cleaning of  to the cleaning of tertiary  tertiary  tertiary  tertiary 
drainage (person drainage (person drainage (person drainage (person- - - -hours) hours) hours) hours)       
 
Tertiary drainage (person-hours) 
 
  Tobit 








Geographical position of plot       
Distance  from  the  main  channel 
(km)  
-1.007  -7.494**   
[0.73]  [2.34]   
Distance  from  the  main  channel 
(km) squared 
0.021  1.503**   
[0.05]  [2.22]   
Distance along tertiary channel (km)  -18.736**  -18.850**  -16.663* 
[2.11]  [2.14]  [1.88] 
Distance along tertiary channel (km) 
squared 
23.810**  26.240***  23.116** 
[2.58]  [2.83]  [2.47] 
Strip characteristics       
No. of strip members  -0.038  -0.018   
[0.81]  [0.31]   
Coefficient of variation of plot size in 
the strip 
0.043*  0.017   
[1.79]  [0.61]   
Household characteristics       
Density of relatives  4.572  2.618  1.892 
[1.27]  [0.68]  [0.43] 
Density of same village member  -1.416  -0.470  -4.407 
[0.71]  [0.22]  [1.52] 
No. of adult hh members  0.362  0.523**  0.572** 
[1.57]  [2.27]  [2.19] 
Average years of education of adult 
hh members 
-0.042  0.021  0.133 
[0.29]  [0.15]  [0.81] 
Size of cultivated area in the sample 
strip (ha) 
34.529***  35.909***  35.370*** 
[4.32]  [4.47]  [3.93] 
Size of cultivated area in the sample 
strip (ha) squared 
-18.250**  -18.919**  -19.336* 
[2.00]  [2.08]  [1.92] 
Size of other cultivated area in DRS  -3.758**  -3.146**  -2.568 
[2.39]  [1.97]  [1.44] 
Size of other cultivated area in DRS 
squared 
0.952**  0.784**  0.828* 
[2.43]  [2.00]  [1.93] 
Size  of  cultivated  area  in  upland 
(ha) 
-0.678  -0.800  -0.586 
[0.84]  [1.00]  [0.68] 
Size  of  cultivated  area  in  upland 
(ha) squared 
0.145  0.176  0.088 
[1.22]  [1.49]  [0.67] 
2nd season 2006  1.512  1.539  1.472 
[1.34]  [1.41]  [1.43] 
1st season 2007  -0.480  -0.460  -0.246 
[0.42]  [0.41]  [0.23] 
2nd season 2007  -2.246**  -2.256**  -2.264** 
[1.97]  [2.02]  [2.14] 
Constant  -0.864  4.053  -1.520 
[0.21]  [0.62]  [0.39] 
Observations  566  566  566 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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